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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to set aside a trust agreement on 
the grounds of mental incompetence of the trustor, fraud, 
and/or undue influence exercised by defendant-respondent 
Thora J. Campbell. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial 
judge, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., granted defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
below. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the decision 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent controverts the "Statement of Facts" con-
tained in appellants' Brief in almost all respects, as said 
statement is in essence an argument of the evidence. The 
facts material to this action are as follows: 
In August of 1970, Marinus Johnson (father of the 
parties to this action) consulted attorneys at the firm of 
Fabian & Clendenin with respect to estate planning. [R. 206]. 
Mr. Johnson eventually executed a will and trust prepared by 
Mssrs. William Vogel and George D. Melling, Jr., attorneys at 
Fabian & Clendenin. The trust was executed on March 5, 1971. 
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It named his daughter, Thora J. Campbell, Trustee. By the terms 
of the trust, $2,500 was to go to Mr. Johnson's son, Eldon, 
certain real and personal property was to go to Thora, and 
the remainder of the trust estate was to be divided in four 
shares, one to daughter LaVerne, one to daughter Darlene, and 
two to Thora. [Plaintiff's Exhibit l]. 
The terms of the trust were carefully explained to 
Mr. Johnson by Mr. Melling at the time of its execution. [R.241· 
Both Mr. Melling and Mr. Vogel testified that Mr. Johnson appear' 
to be completely competent to execute the trust and that there 
was no evidence that he did not know what he was doing or was 
being unduly influenced by anyone. [R. 216, 247]. 
During the four years subsequent to execution of the 
trust and prior to his death in 1975, Mr. Johnson acknowledged 
and ratified the existence and validity of the trust. He con-
veyed several parcels of real property into the trust, assigned 
into it real estate contracts, and signed and filed trust tax 
returns. All of these documents and transactions referred to 
the trust and to the trustee, Thora J. Campbell. [Trial Exhibit: 
2-10, 29, 31, 32, 45]. 
ARGUMENT 
As Judge Baldwin stated in granting defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss, plaintiff did not present "one iota" of evidence 
-2-
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to substantiate their case. As trier of fact in an equitable 
action, Judge Baldwin's decision may be reversed only if the 
evidence strongly preponderates against it or if he abused his 
discretion. Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case, 
as the presumption that might have aided them was obliterated 
by the testimony of their own witnesses. 
The decision in a prior case dealing with related will 
documents is not res judicta of the issues presented to the 
trial court in the instant action. Furthermore, examination 
of the record in both actions makes it patently clear that 
Judge Baldwin's decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
MUST BE AFFIRMED UNLESS 
MANIFESTLY IN ERROR 
The issues tried in this action were equitable in 
nature. Article VIII, §9 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah grants this Court the power to review questions of fact 
and law in equity actions. That standard of review has been 
defined and refined by this Court in several cases. The Court 
has consistently held that, while review may be made of the 
factual record below, the trial court's findings of fact and 
decisions must be given tremendous weight. Thus, it has 
variously been held that the trial court's findings must stand 
unless the evidence so clearly preponderates against them that 
-3-
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the result constitutes a manifest injustice, Hatch v. Bastian, 
567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977), or the evidence clearly preponderat~ 
against the lower court's findings, Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 
811 (Utah 1972),or the findings are clearly erroneous, Nunley 
v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (Utah 1962). This Court has also stated 
that in reviewing the lower court's decision, it must be kept 
in mind that the trial judge had the advantage of hearing and 
seeing the witnesses. Barker v. Dunham, 342 P.2d 867 (Utah 1959; 
II. ANY PRESUMPTION OF UNFAIRNESS OR 
UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS CONTRADICTED 
AND ELIMINATED BY PLAINTIFFS' 
OWN EVIDENCE 
Plaintiffs have placed enormous reliance upon a pre-
sumption used in the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 337 P.2d 
420 (Utah 1959) to establish their prime facie case of undue 
influence. The rule as stated therein is that when a confidenti< 
relationship is established and a gift or conveyance is made to 
the party in a superior position, a presumption arises that the 
transaction was unfair. Id. at 422. Plaintiffs argue that they 
established the presumption by introducing evidence of dealings 
between Marinus Johnson and his daughter Thora, and that the 
burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to overcome the 
presumption. 
Assuming for the purposes of argument that the pre-
sumption of unfairness indeed arose in the course of plaintiffs' 
-4-
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case, the issue upon appeal becomes whether that presumption 
mandated presentation of evidence by the defendant. The answer 
is clearly no. The testimony of plaintiffs' own witnesses 
totally contradicted any presumption that might have arisen. 
As such, the presumption disappeared and plaintiffs were left 
without any basis for a prima facie case. 
As this Court has explained in the past, a presumption 
of the type discussed in the Johnson case is one of law. Pre-
sumptions of law are rebuttable, and disappear from the case 
when evidence to contradict them, sufficient to amount to some 
evidence, is presented. Wyatt v. Baughman, 239 P.2d 193 (Utah 
1951). (Emphasis the Court's). 
It may be the usual case that rebuttal testimony comes 
from the case put on by the party seeking to rebut the presumption. 
If the contradictory testimony comes from the witnesses called 
on behalf of the party who seeks to rely on the presumption, the 
presumption will be eliminated. In The Colorado & Utah Coal 
Company, 369 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1962), the Supreme Court stated, 
citing prior California decisions: 
No party can claim the right of a presumption 
against his own admission under oath. [Cite 
omitted]. The force of a presumption is 
exhausted when a fact which is wholly irrecon-
cilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted 
testimony of the party relying on it ... 
Id. at 799. 
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In Tice v. Kaiser Co. Inc., 226 P.2d 624 (Cal. App. 19Y 
the plaintiff sought to rely upon a presumption that the decease 
had exercised due care. The presumption had arisen during the 
presentation of the case, but the plaintiff went on and called a, 
witnesses the workmen who had seen the subject accident and who 
testified as to the conduct of the deceased. The California cou: 
ruled that the presumption had disappeared: 
In order to be entitled to such a presumption, 
the party relying upon it must first establish 
a sphere or field within which the presumption 
may operate. . . The disputable presumption 
that a decedent exercises due care is dispelled, 
has no probative value, and disappears from the 
case when the litigant relying upon the presump-
tion introduces evidence contrary to the fact 
presumed. 
Id. at 629. 
As will be discussed infra, while plaintiffs' evidence 
in this instant case may have given rise to the presumption 
(i.e. Thora Campbell was a business advisor to her father and 
received more property than her siblings), there was not one 
shred of evidence to support a claim of fraud, undue influence, 
or incompetence. Quite to the contrary, plaintiffs' ownwitness1 
produced convincing and consistent evidence that Marinus Johnson 
knew exactly what he was doing when he executed his trust. Judgi 
Baldwin had no reason to require defendant to put on testimony 
that would only be duplicative and cumulative of that presented 
by plaintiffs. The presumption of unfairness had long since bee; 
-6-
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obliterated by plaintiffs' witnesses, and with its demise went 
plaintiffs' prima facie case. 
III. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE RULING OF THE COURT 
Plaintiffs called six witnesses at trial. There was 
not one bit of evidence that Marinus Johnson was incompetent 
either in 1971 or thereafter until his death. There was not 
one bit of evidence that the distribution in his trust was the 
result of fraud or undue influence. There was not one bit of 
evidence to contradict the fact that Marinus Johnson knew 
exactly what he was doing when he left his property in an unequal 
distribution. 
In contrast to the absolute lack of evidence to support 
plaintiffs' case, the trial court heard the following affirmative 
testimony supporting the validity of the trust: 
William Vogel, an estate specialist with Fabian & 
Clendenin, testified that he first met Marinus Johnson in 
August, 1970. Mr. Johnson was accompanied by Thora Campbell. 
(Incidentally, plaintiffs are in error in their brief wherein 
they claim Mrs. Campbell denied meeting Vogel. See R. 183). 
At that conference, several possibilities for distribution of 
the property were discussed. Plaintiffs infer that Mrs. Campbell 
was railroading the process because she was doing a lot of the 
talking at the meeting. What plaintiffs neglect to tell this 
Court is that Hr. Vogel testified her comments were in response 
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to inquiries into the details of Mr. Johnson's properties. 
[R. 216 and 226]. 
Mr. Vogel sent out a draft trust that provided for 
equal distribution to the three sisters. In their brief, 
plaintiffs would leave this Court with the erroneous impression 
that the distribution had been decided upon by Mr. Johnson. 
Again plaintiffs ignore the testimony of Mr. Vogel: the 
distribution in the draft was an arbitrary election by Vogel 
made only for the purpose of getting a draft instrument to Mr. 
Johnson. [R. 218]. 
Even more seriously misleading is plaintiffs' total 
failure to refer to Mr. Vogel's testimony as to the capacity 
of Mr. Johnson and the circumstances surrounding the execution 
of the trust. First, Mr. Vogel testified that he would take 
particular care when doing an estate for an elderly person. 
[R. 220]. He was fully satisfied that Marinus Johnson under-
stood what he was doing. [R. 221]. Further, he increased his 
usual precautions in light of the unequal distribution of the 
estate. [R. 221]. Finally, he testified [R.222]: 
Q All right. Was there anything that was 
going on, anything that you observed that 
led you to believe or suspect that Marinus 
Johnson was not doing what he wanted to do 
but, rather was being coerced or was being 
unduly influenced by Thora Campbell? 
A There is nothing that led me to suspect 
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that Thora Campbell was unduly influencing 
him. 
Mr. Vogel's partner George D. Melling, Jr. testified. 
Mr. Melling took over the job of finishing the trust agreement. 
Plaintiffs ignore Mr. Melling's testimony with respect to the 
clai~s at issue in the suit. At the time the trust was executed, 
Mr. Melling went over the trust page by page with Mr. Johnson. 
[R. 241]. The trust was revocable, and that provision was pointed 
out. [R. 245]. Particularly in light of the unequal distribution 
under the trust, Mr. Melling was sure the terms of the trust were 
carefully discussed. [R. 246-247]. Like Mr. Vogel, Mr. Melling 
testified that Marinus Johnson was mentally competent to execute 
the trust, and that there was no evidence of undue influence. 
[R. 247]. 
Alta Johnson had no knowledge of the trust during Mr. 
Johnson's lifetime. Her only testimony pertinent to the creation 
of the trust related to the physical and mental condition of Mr. 
Johnson. She testified that he drove his car until 1973, was 
not bedridden, often visited his properties in the southern 
part of Utah, and maintained his social contacts. [R. 295-296]. 
LaVerne Robertson's testimony never touched on anything 
other than her husband's education and the fact that she had not 
lived in Utah for over 35 years. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs' final witness, a grandson named Jeffrey 
Child, said his grandfather in 1971 made a vague allusion to 
the fact he would one day get some of the property (which in 
fact he would under the trust) [R. 307) and that his grandfather 
was perfectly alert and knew what he was doing. [R. 308]. 
In light of this testimony, can one possibly conclude 
that plaintiffs raised even a spectre of mental incompetence, 
fraud, or undue influence? This case is not akin to Johnson 
v. Johnson, ~. where the evidence disclosed that the elderly 
father was senile and did not know what he was doing when he 
gave his son a great deal of his property. 337 P.2d at 423. 
In contrast to the situation before the court in the Johnson 
case, the testimony heard by Judge Baldwin presented a picture 
of a man who was emphatic in wanting a distribution of his 
property that was not to be equal to his four children (testi-
mony of William Vogel, R.216 ), that Mr. Johnson was mentally 
alert and competent, that the trust was fully explained to him, 
that he continued to execute documents respecting the trust 
for four years after its creation, and that during that four 
year period he was able to handle his affairs. 
Judge Baldwin heard all of the testimony and examined 
all of the exhibits, not just the distorted fragments contained 
in plaintiffs' brief. The propriety of his decision is best 
-10-
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measured by attempting to answer this question: what evidence 
presented by plaintiffs was there for defendant to contradict? 
IV. THE JUDGMENT I~ THE WILL 
CONTEST IS NOT DISPOSITIVE 
OF THIS ACTION 
Plaintiffs admit in their brief that the prior will contest 
and the instant case are two separate matters and were properly 
treated as such. The issues involved in a proceeding probating 
a will and one challenging the validity of a trust agreement 
are not at all the same. For one, a trust that might be con-
sidered to have been executed while the settler was being tmduly 
influenced may be subsequently ratified when the settler regains 
his free will. Kazaras v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 156 N.Y.S. 2d 
275, affd. 164 N.Y.S. 2d 211, affd. 175 N.Y.S. 2d 172 (N.Y. 1956); 
Vanderlinde v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 259 N.W. 337 (Mich. 
19 35) . 
It is elementary that relitigation of an issue is barred 
only if the matter to be foreclosed was actually decided in a 
prior proceeding. 5 0 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Judgments" § 172 (1) . 
While the jury in the prior action found two wills of Maritmus 
Johnson to have been executed while Mr. Johnson was under undue 
influence, that was all that was decided. The validity of the 
trust was not before the jury. Questions of ratification were 
not even addressed. There is simply no basis for holding that 
the prior determination is dispositive. 
-11-
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Furthermore, although defendant has chosen not to 
confuse the issues presented by plaintiffs' appeal by pursuing 
an appeal of the prior action, the references in plaintiffs' 
brief to the evidence in the will contest warrant coilil!lent. 
Plaintiffs assert that the testimony in the two trials was 
the same. Plaintiffs are not correct. For instance, in the 
first action Mr. Vogel testified that at the 1970 meeting Mrs. 
Campbell did most of the talking. Nothing further in this regan 
was elicited from him, and the inference certainly existed that 
the defendant was directing the provisions of the will and trust 
That mistaken inference was disspelled in the trust trial when 
Mr. Vogel explained that Mrs. Campbell was only giving informati1 
as to the details of her father's properties. 
A similar omission in the first trial was that Mr. 
Vogel was never asked whether Marinus Johnson expressed a 
desire to change the equal distribution under his 1969 will 
(which was eventually probated). In the trust action, Mr. 
Vogel testified that Mr. Johnson was emphatic about reducing 
his son's share [R. 216]. In the first trial neither of the 
lawyers was asked his opinion as to the competence or free will 
of Mr. Johnson. Their testimony in the latter trial was unequi~ 
In short, the judgment of the jury might seem at odds wi: 
Judge Baldwin's decision, but it is entirely explainable when 
one considers the additional evidence adduced in the trial of th1 
-12-
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trust. And in any event the evidence of ratification makes the 
jury's determination in the earlier action totally irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs had every opportunity to produce evidence of 
fraud, undue influence, and mental incompetence. What they came 
up with were witnesses who testified that Marinus Johnson under-
stood what he was doing, that the attorneys who prepared the 
trust fully and carefully explained its content and effect to 
him, and that he participated in the operation of the trust from 
the date of its execution until his death some four years later. 
Plaintiffs wholly failed to put into the record any evidence to 
support their claims. The trial court was entirely correct in 
sparing the defendant the unnecessary effort of responding to 
plaintiffs' case, as plaintiffs had already done an effective 
job of putting on consistent and convincing testimony substan-
tiating defendant's position that the trust of Marinus Johnson 
was valid in all respects. 
For these and all other foregoing reasons, defendant 
respectfully submits that the Order of Dismissal entered in 
the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of June, 1981. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Ann L. Wassermanrt: 
4L'- l i 1,J..-1--:JC(Jt ~-<A~ 
Attorneys for De endant-Respondent 
SO South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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